Double Threat: The expansion of Russia’s hybrid strike arsenal poses a risk of Kyiv’s defeat and brings a possible war in Europe closer

Seizing the initiative and a new arsenal

Against the backdrop of the stalemate in ground operations, the air war has gradually become the main battlefield in the protracted Russia-Ukraine conflict. In the spring of this year, Ukraine gained a significant advantage on this front by substantially increasing the effectiveness of its long-range strikes deep inside Russia and achieving a genuine breakthrough in the theatre of mid-range strikes (→ Re:Russia: The Second Theatre of War; Re:Russia: Corridor of Opportunity). However, Ukraine’s then Minister of Defence Fedorov warned that the window of Ukrainian advantage would be limited, estimating it at around six months. Signs that the initiative was shifting to Russia nevertheless emerged as early as August and have become increasingly apparent since the beginning of autumn. Moscow is intensifying its air strikes against Ukraine along several axes at once: Black Sea ports, infrastructure and industrial facilities, the railway network, the energy sector and, separately, Kyiv. The main military resource behind this counteroffensive has been the modernisation and expansion of Russia’s aerial strike capabilities.

One of the most significant threats to Ukraine is posed by new variants of the Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones equipped with jet engines. The first jet-powered Shahed drones were spotted in Ukraine as early as January 2024, but they have evolved significantly since then and are increasingly approaching cheap cruise missiles in terms of speed, manoeuvrability and methods of use, according to the Ukrainian investigative project Texty. At the same time, they are at least 10 times cheaper than the conventional cruise missiles produced by Russia. The Geran-4, which can reach speeds of up to 500 km/h with a payload of up to 300 kg and a range of 850 km, is estimated to cost up to $120,000, while the Geran-5, with a speed of 600 km/h, a range of 1,000 km and a 90 kg warhead, costs up to $150,000. By contrast, according to current estimates, producing an Iskander-K missile costs the Russian Ministry of Defence approximately $1.5 million, a Kalibr $2–6.5 million, and a Kh-101 around $13 million.

In addition, Russia is expanding its arsenal of low-cost missiles and missile-like systems. A striking example of such hybrids is the Banderol, an inexpensive combination of a kamikaze drone and a cruise missile. The missile is manufactured by the Russian company Kronstadt. It is 5 metres long with a wingspan of 2.2 metres, carries a 114 kg warhead and is capable of reaching speeds of up to 650 km/h. The Banderol was first used in Ukraine as early as March 2025. Since May 2026, Ukrainian sources have recorded a growing number of instances of its use, and in June, Banderol missiles attacked Kyiv for the first time. The Banderol is carried by Orion drones and helicopters, and its cost is higher than that of Shahed drones, which limits its wider use, as Ukrainian aviation expert Konstantin Krivolap noted back in June. However, as early as August, an adviser to the President of Ukraine, Serhii ‘Flash’ Beskrestnov, reported that, given the high effectiveness of the Banderol against Ukrainian air defence systems, manufacturers were scaling up production and planned to reach 300–400 units per month.

Other new strike capabilities introduced by the Russian armed forces include the Dan-T small cruise missile and the RM-48U surface-to-air missile. Both are based on target missiles originally designed to train air-defence crews. The original Dan-M target missile descended by parachute after launch, allowing it to be reused several times, explains Ukrainian aviation expert Anatolii Khrapchynskyi. In the modification, the parachute and the lens used to simulate an airborne target were removed, turning it into the Dan-T, a cruise missile with a range of up to 500 km and a top speed of 750 km/h. Its use appears to have begun in August or September this year. According to estimates by Ukrainian experts, Russia could produce up to 2,000 such missiles this year and up to 14,000 in 2027, meaning it would be producing more than 1,000 per month. The RM-48U anti-aircraft missile is a modified target missile for the S-300/400 systems. The Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine (HUR) reported as early as December 2025 that Russia possessed an arsenal of more than 400 such missiles, with their first use recorded in January 2026. In March 2026, military expert Michael Kofman drew attention to the RM-48U, describing it as a ‘growing threat’ from Russia. According to Reuters, RM-48U missiles accounted for more than half of the missiles launched at Ukraine in July and early August 2026. Although the missile is less accurate than conventional strike systems, its mass deployment allows Ukrainian air defences to be worn down. According to Reuters sources, Russia produced more than 200 such missiles in 2025 and plans to produce 480 in 2026.

Lessons from ‘garage-style’ modernisation

The Gerans are a striking example of the toolkit Russia is using to modernise and adapt its air arsenal. Journalists from Radio Free Europe’s Ukraine bureau, examining one of the unexploded Geran-4 drones, found a Chinese TG-2000 jet engine, a Mesh modem and a SIM card inside. These components allow the drone to be controlled in real time and to relay signals. In early October, Serhii ‘Flash’ Beskrestnov stated that several such Mesh repeaters had been covertly installed in Kyiv. The new-generation Gerans are also equipped with a 16-channel CRPA antenna, making them more resistant to radio interference, as well as a gimballed camera with day, night and infrared channels and 10x optical zoom, enabling targets to be selected in real time. The newest Geran-5 drones are even capable of flying without GPS or communication with their operator. Instead, the drones use an optoelectronic navigation system that compares images of the Earth’s surface with pre-programmed data in real time and refines the flight path.

The ability to adapt to the conditions of warfare and modernise its arsenal demonstrated by Russia in 2026 is not an isolated case but a systemic issue. The Russian military is narrowing its technological gap with Ukraine, warns former Google CEO Eric Schmidt, whose company developed a number of high-tech drones for the Ukrainian armed forces, including the Hornet, used to strike logistics in occupied territories. Moscow has recently become much more effective at conducting the conflict, while the Kremlin is ‘moving towards a strategy of total war, mobilising its factories and human resources to bombard Ukraine’, Schmidt writes. For Kyiv to withstand this pressure, he argues, ‘the West must mobilise its collective resources on a scale sufficient to outproduce its adversary in weapons over an extended period’. Schmidt argues that, in effect, the West should regard the Ukrainian armed forces as an extension and component of its own military machine.

Last year, Dara Massicot, a military expert at the Carnegie Endowment who specialises in the Russian defence industry, also wrote about the positive trajectory of the adaptation of the Russian defence industry. She attributes this to the fact that the Ministry of Defence has relaxed the rules and regulations governing the development and implementation of innovations. This shortened R&D cycles, while civilian universities and research centres became more closely integrated with the defence establishment. Russian military expert Ruslan Pukhov also notes significant progress at the institutional level: manufacturers are implementing innovations much faster than before. Kateryna Bondar, an expert at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), in a study of the adoption of AI in Russian unmanned systems, writes that Russian drones are characterised by a highly adaptive procurement model in which innovations emerge outside the defence industry and are scaled up only after being tested in combat.

This does not, however, mean that Russia is close to a breakthrough or has seized the technological initiative. It has not. A systemic transition to a new technological level remains an unresolved problem for Russia, as demonstrated by the development of the Rassvet broadband satellite communications system, which could compensate the Russian military for its loss of access to Starlink (→ Re:Russia: Disconnected From Reality). In March, 16 production satellites from the system were launched into orbit. One was lost, while only 12 reached the target orbit at 870 km. The second launch, on 19 July, currently appears to have been unsuccessful: of the 16 satellites launched, none had reached the required orbit, according to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). The authors of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) report Russia’s Selective Adaptation also highlight these features of Russian military modernisation. At the tactical level, the Russian military has demonstrated a strong capacity for learning. The integration of unmanned systems has improved and targeting has become more effective. At the fundamental level, however, it remains a highly politicised instrument in the Kremlin’s hands and retains a rigid hierarchy that views operational initiative at lower levels as a threat.

The evolution of Russia’s strike technologies also demonstrates that Russia is not undergoing a structural transformation, but is instead expanding and adapting the use of systems that have already been tested. The success of the new Gerans and the Banderol ersatz missile can be explained in part by the generally advanced state of Russia’s strike missile technologies, with existing capabilities being adapted to the conditions of the current war. CSIS experts Kateryna Bondar and Nicole Errera write that the rapid progress in modernising the Gerans illustrates how Russia has managed, in a relatively short period, to build the organisational and industrial capacity for the continuous improvement of these strike drones, which are technically primitive weapons by most measures. At the same time, two plants, Alabuga and the Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant ‘Kupol’, are involved in their modernisation. Competing with each other, they introduce improvements without the standard certification procedures. According to the authors, such a system would be impossible in the United States, where procurement programmes are structured around a single prime contractor and the integration of commercial components into military systems is treated as a risk.

This kind of bottom-up ‘garage-style’ modernisation has an important characteristic. In essence, it involves fitting low-cost systems with high-tech components, creating an optimal balance between cost and effectiveness that makes the resulting capability scalable. This is becoming a strategic advantage in today’s conditions, when air-defence systems are structurally disadvantaged against offensive systems in terms of both cost and quantity. Even strike systems that are not particularly effective or accurate can, by overloading air defences, not only inflict a degree of damage but also increase the effectiveness of expensive missiles and the overall impact of combined missile and drone attacks.

Double threat: the window of strike opportunities

Russia’s missile arsenal has long been one of Ukraine’s main problems due to the lack of air defence capabilities. As early as August, Kyiv stated that, due to a shortage of interceptors for the Patriot system, it could no longer shoot down Russian ballistic missiles (→ Re:Russia: Summer Takeaways From The Infrastructure War). The modernisation of Russian strike capabilities has been pursued deliberately with the aim of maximising this Russian advantage despite limited resources.

According to data from Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate, Russia is fulfilling its production plan for ballistic and cruise missiles at 110–120%, while its annual production targets for Zircon and Oniks missiles were reached within the first seven months of this year. Overall, Russia’s defence industry produces up to 110 ballistic missiles and up to 120 cruise missiles per month. The Banderol, Dan-T and RM-48U surface-to-air missile could add around another 1,500 systems a year to this arsenal. Ukrainian military analyst Dmytro Putiata notes that Russia is expected to begin deploying a number of new strike weapons in Ukraine, including the S-71 missiles and the Filin strike drone. Serhii ‘Flash’ Beskrestnov also notes that Russia is developing new long-range strike capabilities that it plans to deploy over the next five to six months.

Ukraine still lacks an effective means of intercepting jet-powered drones. While Ukrainian air defences were shooting down 80–90% of conventional Russian strike drones at the beginning of the year, this figure had fallen to 70% by September as the share of jet-powered variants increased, Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged. The head of the Communications Directorate of the Ukrainian Air Force, Yurii Ihnat, stated that in August jet-powered drones accounted for two-thirds of all UAVs launched by Russia. Dara Massicot describes the Geran-4 and Geran-5 as a ‘growing threat that will intensify in winter’ as production scales up. In August, Ukrainian military sources estimated the production volume of attack drones at approximately 5,800 per month, including 3,000 jet-powered drones.

The escalation of the missile and drone threat in the fifth year of the war has become Russia’s most effective strategy and could give it a significant, if not decisive, advantage in the war this winter. However, it is more accurate to speak of a double threat. Although the current modernisation of Russian weapons remains limited in scope, it poses a serious threat not only to Ukraine but also to Europe, and particularly at the present moment.

As recently as last year, most military experts and analytical centres, as well as most intelligence agencies, including the US intelligence community, assumed that Putin would not provoke NATO countries before the end of the war in Ukraine. At the same time, some analysts, including the Re:Russia project, pointed to an alternative scenario in which such a provocation could serve as a means of breaking the deadlock in which Russia found itself in its war against Ukraine (→ Re:Russia: A Fox in the Baltic). Now, sources cited by The Wall Street Journal within US intelligence claim that the US intelligence community has also fundamentally revised its assessment and sees signs of a scenario in which the Kremlin increases the number of incidents in the airspace over eastern NATO countries in an effort to test the Alliance’s readiness to respond. European intelligence officials, military leaders and politicians are warning of possible escalation within the coming months.

At the same time, Europe’s ability to respond to the Russian air threat remains limited for now. Air-defence systems are not adapted to deal with large-scale missile and drone attacks. The European Drone Defence Initiative announced in 2025 has so far fallen short of expectations, as it focuses on financing the production of interceptors through major European contractors while neglecting the architecture required for detection and defence, writes the Belfer Centre. The initiative has still not resolved the issue of production standardisation, creating a risk that more than 27 incompatible systems could be developed. NATO and the EU still effectively lack an agreed protocol for responding to hybrid threats, as Andreas Umland and Lesya Bidochko note in The National Interest.

In the longer term, Europe will probably be able to mobilise sufficient resources through collective efforts to defend itself and mount a counterstrike in the air, restoring its military advantage. However, rapid technological innovation during the Russia-Ukraine conflict is giving Russia a degree of advantage in the air war through the scaling up of relatively inexpensive strike systems, thereby opening a ‘window of opportunity’ for the Kremlin today. The modernisation and expansion of the Russian military’s strike capabilities observed in 2026 are strengthening this temporary advantage, making escalation against NATO countries more attractive in the Kremlin’s eyes before that advantage begins to wane.